The principal objective of applying the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) in Radar System Identification (RSI) is to show that the recognition performance of a HMM exceeds that of the conventional methods such as cross-correlation. An important offshoot of this research is to provide a method for choosing the optimal model parameters for an actual radar signal so that a library of HMMs can be created and used for practical EW tasks. Therefore, optimal threshold settings between competing HMMs should be investigated to improve overall recognition performance. In this paper, a new method for predicting the false recognition rates and deriving optimal decision regions between competing HMMs that model the dynamic behavior of the radars stored in the threat library of the Electronic Warfare (EW) is proposed. The proposed method uses only the prior pulse repetition interval (PRI) statistics of a known radar and template matching which can lead to a qualitative understanding into radar correlation. Moreover, the paper investigates the idea of a threshold setting so that the receiver can have a reject option and decide that an observation sequence does not belong to any of the HMMs in its library. Computer simulations are performed through the paper to validate the obtained theoretical analysis.
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Introduction:
In [1] , [2] , it is assumed that any pulsed radar observation sequence necessarily belong to one of the HMMs in the threat library of the Electronic Warfare (EW) system. Unfortunately this is not a practical assumption because there will be invariably unknown foreign signals in the environment. It is, therefore, required that a decision on the signal source also includes the possibility of classifying it as unidentifiable [3] . In other words, a reject option must be included if the respective recognition probabilities of all the HMMs fall below a given threshold. This idea is analogous to a HMM that can not recognize a spoken word or phoneme in speech recognition. This paper, investigates first the decision threshold for observation sequences generated by HMMs in the threat library. Afterwards, a threshold will be discussed for foreign sequences.
A search for analytic method for determining an optimum decision threshold of a given HMM is difficult because there is no simple analytic probability density function (PDF) for a HMM. Ways to overcome this problem is proposed in this paper. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will introduce the idea of a distance vector for pseudo-random sources and show that it is possible to use this vector as a method for analytically calculating a probability of error (false recognition) for a given HMM. Section 3 will follow the method used in [4] in an effort to show that any prescribed threshold will have to be dependent on the HMM being used. That is there is no optimal universal threshold for all HMMs within a given threat library. Section 4 presents the application of the proposed method to obtain a decision threshold for unknown signals. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
Pseudo-Random Source Distance Vector:
Because we are only using the PRI of the received signal, it is difficult to extract an extensive information about the source. The parameters of a HMM we use to model the source work well as long as the observed sequence is not too corrupted and not too short. How corrupted and how short an observation depend not only on the correct model's parameters, but also on those competing HMMs in the threat library. Presumably it would be advantageous to know exactly how long a certain observation sequence must be before there is little or no possibility of an incorrect model obtaining the highest recognition probability since this could be a cut-off length. Any received signal shorter than this length would automatically be classified as "unknown" or rejected since it has a high likelihood of being erroneously classified. In addition, knowing how corrupted a sequence can be before false recognition begins to occur could aid in deciding whether to reject the sequence or not. Unfortunately, it is not possible for a receiver to determine what the error level of an observation sequence is. In any event, the false recognition rate of a particular HMM in a threat library is a function of its parameters A, B, the parameters of every other competing model, the length of the observation sequence, and the number of errors in a sequence. All these variables make it extremely difficult to predict a false recognition rate and thus an optimal decision threshold for a HMM.
The idea of distance vector for a pseudo-random source attempts to simplify the problem by determining a threshold that is independent of the HMM parameters and concentrates solely on the source's prior PRI statistics. The only variables we now need to concern ourselves with are the length of the observation sequence and the characteristics of the competing models. In addition, it is assumed that there are no errors in the observation sequence.
The distance vector of a pseudo-random source is defined as a vector containing the expected values of all possible transitions per word from time t to t+T. For example take T=1 so that from time t to t+1 there are the following four 2-symbol transitions: 
Received Symbols
Time=t Time=t+1
It is possible for these signal transitions to occur within a given word (intra-word transition) or between two different words (inter-word transition). By calculating the expected value of each transition per word, it is possible to define a distance vector d, that can be used to find the mean squared Euclidian distance between two different pseudo-random sources.
Take for example, the following artificial radar (radar 4) containing two equiprobable words. Word 1: [0 1] with probability 0.5 and Word 2: [0 0 1] with probability 0.5 So that the conceivable generated sequence could be:01 001 001 01 001
The notation
will be used to define the expected value of going from observed symbol o t at time t to the next symbol o t+1 at time t+1 per word. Therefore, E[0 , 0] can be found by summing all possible ways in which '0' can be followed by another '0' multiplied by the probability of such an event happening. Here, the only way this event can occur is within word 2 and so 2 1 1 2
occurrences of the event probability of the word probability of going from symbol t o to 1 t o ). The event '0' followed by a '1' can occur within both words so
The event '1' followed by a '0' occurs only during inter-word transitions so the probability becomes the joint probability of being in the first word and going to the second word. Since these events are statistically 1 1 5 . 0 (1) and the total square distance between these two is defined as: 
The square root of this distance is found to be 0.6614(see Appendix A, B).
This value, 0.6614 is the average distance between these two radars for one word including the transition to the next word. The average distance will increase linearly with this value as the number of words increases. Obviously, the greater the distance the more different the two sequences will be and thus, the less likely they will be confused as having originated from the wrong source. This is equivalent to the false alarm rate being low for long test sequences and being high for short ones. Figure 1 shows the actual and expected distance between these two radars as the number of words increases. Note that there are no errors in both sequences. The distance vectors for both radars are computed by counting the number of 2-symbol transitions that occur in each sequence divided by the number of the words in the sequence. The Euclidian distance is then calculated by taking the square root of equation (2). 
Figure (1). Expected and actual euclidian distance between radar 3 and radar 4
Although the actual distance as a function of words may appear erratic, if it is averaged over 50 independent trials (50 different sequences generated) for every sequence length, it converges to the expected distance as shown in Figure 2 In theory, increasing the value of T would provide more information about the source. That is, knowing the number of expected transitions from time t to t+10 would certainly yield a more specific distance vector than the 2-symbol transition vector used previously. Unfortunately, the vector would become increasingly sparse and its entries would become increasingly small making it is difficult to accurately calculate the source's theoretical distance vector. For this reason it was decided to use distance vector with T=2 (3-symbol transitions implying an 8-component distance vector).
Distance Vector as Probability Distributions:
If we normalize the distance vector described in Section 2, then it will be possible to obtain a PDF of the pseudo-random source. More precisely, . The probability that we receive a '0' followed by another '0' in this case would be 
Mean Squared Error (MSE) Distribution:
The mean squared error (MSE) between the received and theoretical pseudo-random source's PDF can be shown to follow one of two possible distributions depending on whether the received probability vector belongs to a given theoretical probability vector or not. For example, if the received probability vector is of the form turn, means that the MSE will also decrease as the number of samples gets larger or, equivalently as the observation sequence gets longer.
With the above theory, we can say the following related to the 3-symbol transition probability vector (n = 8). 1-For the proper model (the theoretical and the received probability vectors originate from the same source), the MSE between them will approach zero as the number of words (samples), m, tends to infinity. 2-For all other models the MSE will approach the bias of the model as compared to the proper model as the number of words (samples), m, tends to infinity. The second statement is more readily understood if we write it mathematically. The combination of these two transformations is equivalent to the MSE calculation shown in equation (4) . That is, Z is equivalent to 2 MSE d . If we are dealing with the proper model then it can be shown that [6, pp41-44 ] Z is a central Chi-Square distribution with n degrees of freedom and has the following first two moments: The probability that the MSE of a competing model is smaller than that of proper model, a false recognition can be defined in terms of the log likelihood ratio, Z for equal prior probabilities and uniform costs as:
where Z is defined as
representing the MSE probability conditioned on the proper model and 
where, n is the number of i.i.d Gaussian random variables ( the components of the normalized distance vector) and x is the gamma function. This is the Chi-Square distribution with n degrees of freedom. The distribution of the MSE conditioned on 1 H is given as is the th -order modified Bessel function of the first kind. After some algebraic manipulations, we get the following log-likelihood ratio test 
where we would choose H 0 if the left hand side were greater than the threshold, 1 , H 1 if it were less than 1 , and either hypothesis could be chosen if there were equality between the two sides. Several simulations were run to verify the many assumptions that have been made and the probability properties that have been used in the preceding pages regarding the distribution and independence of the eight components of the probability distribution vector. Figure 3 shows the distribution of . Figure 4 shows the average value of the same component after being translated by
. The translated random variable now has a mean of 0.0002 with the same variance as before (   5   10  7103  .  3 ). If we look at the translated distribution using a competing model (the theoretical vector for radar 5) we see the mean of the distribution as the difference between the theoretical components of the two models. Note that in Figure 5 , the mean is -0.0688 which corresponds to the difference in the expected values of the first components for radar 3 
Z E
Assuming that all eight components are identically distributed (same variance) we get the following output mean and variance for Z. for the mean and variance respectively. This demonstrates that the eight components are not identically distributed, but do have, however, very similar variances. Although a second simulation will not produce the exact same results (due to the random nature of signals), it would still yield similar conclusions. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the MSE for a competing model which, in this case, is radar1. The theoretical bias between models 1 and 3 is calculated to be 
Figure (7): MSE Distribution for competing model
The general conclusion is that it is possible to derive an analytical expression for the probability of error (false recognition) between two pseudo-random sources one being the correct model and one being a competitor-based only on a priori PRI statistics of each source. Figure 8 shows the theoretical MSE distribution of both central and non-central ChiSquare distribution with 8 n degrees of freedom where the non-centrality parameter, 2 S , is equal to 2 and the variance, 2 is equal to 0.25. Figure 9 shows the log likelihood function, Z log . Note that the zero-crossing in Figure 9 occurs at the same MSE value when the two curves intersect in Figure 8 . Figure 10 shows how the probability of the false recognition (choosing 1 H when 0 H is true) increases as the variance (and, accordingly the MSE) increases. The probability of false recognition can be described mathematically as
False Recognition Probability Example:

Proceedings of the
where is chosen as the MSE value when the log likelihood function crosses zero. The false recognition probability was calculated using MATLAB where equations 18 and 19 were set to equal each other in order to determine the threshold and equation 21 was used for the actual probability calculations. As would be expected, the false recognition rate goes up as the variance in our MSE estimate increases. The variance increases as fewer samples (words) are received which explains why short sequences produce high false recognition rates than do long ones.
Simulation Results:
This subsection compares the theoretical probability of false recognition to actual simulation results. The simulation uses radar 3 as the correct model and radar 1 as a competitor. The theoretical non-centrality parameter, 
Figure (11): MSE VS Test Sequence Length (Radar 3 Being the
Correct Model) Figure 12 shows how the variance of the MSE estimate decreases as a function of the observation sequence length. Figure 13 shows the relationship between MSE estimate of the proper model and the variance of this estimate. This plot is generated from 500 different test sequences Figure 14 compares the theoretical calculation for the false recognition probability to the simulation results. The actual false recognition probability is calculated by counting the number of times the MSE between the received and correct probability vectors is not the smallest (a competing model has a smaller MSE) as a function of the observation sequence length, and, correspondingly, the MSE variance (equation 8). The theoretical curve is computed using MATLAB in a similar manner to Figure 10 Although the theoretical curve is only a coarse approximation for the actual false recognition probabilities, it does still offer an insight into the relationship between the MSE and false recognition rate. The curve could probably seem to more closely resemble the actual data by lowering the value of 2 S , but 0.0286 is already very close to the lower bound ability of the MATLAB program to solve the equation dz Z P H 0 since such small variances are involved this could, in turn, lead to round-off error in the calculations. Table 2 shows the actual average recognition probability of 8 HMMs for 1500 different test sequences each containing 20 words. The rows correspond to the radar that was used to generate the observation sequence while the columns indicate the recognition probability of each HMM for that sequence. Note that HMM 1 is the trained model for radar 1, HMM 2 is the trained model for radar 2 and so on. Notice how highest recognition probability per row occurs when the HMM used is the same as the radar source generating the sequence. The table, however, is not symmetric. As an example, the recognition probability (-44.8571) is computed by HMM 3 with radar 1 generating the sequence is not the same as the recognition probability (-39.7264) is computed by HMM 1 for radar 3. In other words, HMM 1 is more likely to falsely classify a signal from radar 3 than HMM 3 is likely to incorrectly classify a signal from radar 1. Table 3 shows the relative difference in recognition probabilities between all 8 competing models. Figure 15 provides a graphical representation of the first row in Table 5 .3, that is, the relative difference in the recognition probabilities between the correct and competing models with radar 1 as the test sequences generator. Obviously, the smaller the relative difference the greater the likelihood that a false recognition could occur. Figure 16 uses radar 1 and radar 3 as the generators of 500, 10-word length test sequences and displays the actual recognition probabilities for HMM 1 (shown as stars) and HMM 3 (shown as squares) as coordinates in the x-y plane. The x-axis represents the recognition probability of HMM 1 and the y-axis is the recognition probability of HMM 3 . Notice how, on the whole, both HMMs correctly classify the observation sequences. Those sequences that are incorrectly classified lie on the wrong side of the decision boundary line x y (the maximum-likelihood (ML) threshold) which is drawn as a reference to more easily see when false recognition occurs. Recall from Table 2 that HMM 1 is more likely to incorrectly classify a signal from radar 3 than HMM 3 could classify a signal from radar 1. It is seen in Figure 16 that some squares are lying above the decision line, but no stares lying below it. The scatter patterns, for each HMM, have also been elliptically drawn to show the general distribution of the recognition probabilities. The area between the two ellipses when they intersect each other has a closed form expression and represents a 'reject' region. A recognition point 1 3 , O P O P lying in the intersection of the two ellipses if exists would be unclassifiable due to a lack of sufficient information in the observation sequence. Figure 17 gives a graphical 3-dimensional histogram view of Figure 16 , The observation sequences used in this simulation are 25-words long, which explains why there are no false recognition points as compared to Figure 16 where the sequences were only 10-words long. It is interesting to note that the histograms provide a jointly Gaussian distribution for the two scatter patterns. This is even more evident in Figure  18 where the distributions of the radar 1 and 3 test sequence patterns are shown for each axis respectively. Figure 19 gives a spatial view of these distributions. It is evident from the previous figures that the distribution of the recognition probabilities for both scatter patterns in Figure 16 closely resembles a jointly lognormal distribution in the HMM 1 and HMM 3 axes. In general, an L-dimensional recognition probability space (probability space with L competing HMMs) could be described by the multivariate Gaussian density function. where T represents the matrix transpose function. The Gaussian PDF is described by [8] 
Figure (13): MSE Vs variance of estimate
Gaussian Distribution of HMM Recognition Probability:
In the special 2-dimensional (L=2) case described in the preceding sections, the distributions of the scatter patterns in Figure 16 would follow a bivariate Gaussian density function with covariance matrix 1 ; 
Decision Threshold with Unknown Signals:
The decision threshold shown in the preceding sections assumes that the only two possible signals that can be received originate from either radar 1 or radar 3. If a recognition point lies above the threshold then the classification output will be for radar 1; if it lies below the threshold then the output will be in favour of radar 3. What would happen, however, if the received signals were from an unknown sourceneither radar 1 nor radar 3? Both HMMs would still compute recognition probabilities (one being larger than the other) which would imply that the signal would be erroneously classified since it do not belong to either. Instead, it would be highly desirable for the receiver to say that it can not recognize the signal because it has no representative HMM in the threat library. That is, how small must the recognition probabilities computed by HMMs 1 and 3 be before the receiver rejects the observation sequence? Recall from Section 4 that the intersection of the two ellipses in Figure 16 could be a region in which the receiver would say that it does not have enough information (too short test sequence) to decide from which radar the received signal is originated. In a similar manner, if a recognition point fall outside the ellipse, it would make sense to decide that the observation sequence was generated from unknown source. Figure 21 shows the scatter patterns for HMMs 1 and 3 with three different radar sources: radar 1, radar 3 and unknown radar. Since the unknown radar's scatter pattern lies below the line, x y , decision threshold, it would be incorrectly classified as radar 3 if there were no reject option for HMM 3 . Because in a practical situation it would not be possible to construct such a scatter plot for a foreign signal since the PRI statistics are unknown, a threshold must be constructed based on our confidence of the positions of the recognition points for the known signals. The probabilities of false recognition of unknown signal and missed detection of known signal would both depend on our confidence level. Have to rely solely on the known statistics of the scatter patterns for the HMMs in the threat library. A preliminary approach would be to use the ellipse in Figure 21 as a foreign signal reject threshold; any recognition point lying outside the ellipse would be rejected. A typical scatter plot such as that one shown in Figure 21 would therefore consists of two reject regions. The first would be the region where we decide that the observation sequence is not long enough to classify and can be described by the intersection of the two ellipses if exist. The second region would be that area lying outside each ellipse in order to avoid incorrect classification of unknown signals.
Conclusions:
This paper proposes a method for determining pre-assigned threshold settings and reject regions for the competing HMMs. The proposed method used the concept of distance vectors which relied purely on a prior knowledge of a radar's PRI statistics. This was a template-matching classification system where the observation vector was compared to theoretical vectors and a correlation made according to the mean squared error. It was shown that the MSE between a theoretical probability vector and a 
